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An analysis of examples for the interpretation of the 
word ia in Dharmakrti’s definition of the thesis 
 
T a k a s h i  I w a t a ,  T o k y o  
 
 
The purpose of defining the thesis (paka) in inference-for-others (parrthnu-
mna), according to Dharmakrti (ca 600–660 CE), is to remove a false view in 
which what is to be proved and what is not to be proved are reversed.1 By 
defining the thesis, one is able to refute fallacious theses that are deliberately 
stated in an ambiguous way where the proponent avoids stating explicitly what 
he intends to prove lest his statement be refuted. Dharmakrti’s interest in the 
purpose for giving the definition of the thesis is closely linked to the introduc-
tion of a new idea, not found explicitly in Dignga (ca 480–540 CE), in the 
interpretation of the word ia “intended [by the proponent]” in the definition of 
the thesis.2 Dharmakrti believes that those theses which are stated ambiguously 
with a view to avoiding a criticism can be refuted on the basis of his distinctive 
interpretation of the word ia, namely, the specification that what the propo-
nent really intends to prove is the thesis, and not anything that is merely stated 
and that differs from the statement that is to be proved.  
Dharmakrti sought to simplify Dignga’s account of similar topics con-
nected with the definition of the thesis and that of the reason. In a previous pa-
per I have treated these points, and as an example of the refutation of fallacious 
theses I have examined Dharmakrti’s argument against one proposed by the 
Skhyas.3 
                     
1 Cf. PVin III 288a8–b1; Iwata 2007, n.5. For studies of the definition of the thesis see 
Tillemans 2000, 47ff. I would like to express my thanks to Prof. Tillemans who kindly 
corrected my English and gave me information concerning the Sanskrit manuscripts of 
PVin III and Dh, and to Prof. O’Leary who kindly checked my English draft. 
2 For the role of the term ia in Dharmakrti’s thesis, see Tillemans 2000, 49ff., Iwata 
2007, 277f. 
3 See Iwata 2007, 278f. 
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Among the examples of fallacious theses which are refuted by Dharmakrti, 
some have complex contents, and hence the exemplified theses themselves be-
come an object of investigation. Having seen that the opponents, for example 
the Crvkas, had taken full advantage of this complexity in order to paper over 
a tricky argument by not expressing what they really wanted to prove, Dhar-
makrti insisted that their theses must be refuted in a logically persuasive way 
and thus he revealed the failures of their theses. In this paper I shall analyze 
such examples of fallacious theses and show that Dharmakrti’s own interpre-
tation of the term ia in the definition of the thesis serves effectively to refute 
them. 
The word ia in the definition of the thesis implies that the statement in-
tended by the proponent is precisely that which is to be proved (sdhya), even 
if it is not stated explicitly. Against this claim of Dharmakrti an opponent 
raises the objection that, insofar as an inference-for-others consists of a verbal 
expression of a valid reason, only that which is stated explicitly is the thesis to 
be proved, not that which is implied in the context of discussion: 
[Objection:] [In an inference-for-others not only a specific property which is not 
under discussion but] also that [which is under discussion] is not that which is to be 
proved (sdhya), because it is not stated.4 [Answer:] Suppose that, when a proving 
[factor] (sdhana) [as the reason] is presented (upanyasta) because of a dispute 
(vivda) about a certain (topic), that (topic) [i.e., the basis for the presentation of the 
reason] were not that which is to be proved, what then is that which is to be proved? 
If, further, it were so [i.e., if nothing but that which is stated (uktamtra) were the 
sdhya] either the opposite [of the intended property to be proved] could be proved 
(viparyayasiddhi) or [the proof] would be quite useless (vaiphalya)5.6 
Dharmakrti indicates that for his opponent, who insists that only what is ex-
plicitly stated is the thesis, it would follow either that the opposite of what is to 
be proved is proved or that the proof itself is useless. 
                     
4 See Dh 20a4f. = Skt. ms. 15b7: na keva<la>m aprakto vieo na sdhya	, prakto 
<’>py anuktatvt parrthe <’>numne na sdhya	. 
5 See Dh 20a7 = Skt. ms. 16a1f.: tathety uktamtrasya ca sdhyatve viparyayasiddhi 
sdhanasya v vaiphalya syt(1) ((1)sy ms.). 
6 PVin III 289a3f.: ma brjod pa’i phyir de ya bsgrub par bya ba ma yin no e na / gal 
te ga la rtsod pas (D 191a4 ; pa P) sgrub par byed pa bkod pa de bsgrub par bya ba 
ma yin na (1bsgrub par bya ba ci yin1) / de lta yin na phyin ci log tu grub pa’am don med 
par ’gyur te / ((1)kin tatsdhya MsI 37a2; tad kim idn sdhya / MsII 35b3. The 
original Skt. text might have been kim idn(?) sdhyam), translated in Tani 1984, 8; 
see Ce'e PV IV 33: sdhana yadvivdena nyasta tac cen na sdhyate / ki sdhyam 
anyathnia bhaved vaiphalyam eva v // (= Tillemans 2000, 56); Tani 1984, 9. 
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I.  The Avyutpattivdins’ argument against the Vyutpattivdins in favor of 
the thesis that the word has its proper object before its connection with 
the named 
By means of two examples Dharmakrti illustrates these two undesirable con-
sequences of the false assumption that only that which is stated explicitly is the 
thesis. As an example of the second consequence, uselessness of the proof, he 
takes the Skhyas’ inference of the existence of the Self, which I have treated 
in Iwata 2007. As an example of the first consequence, the proof of the oppo-
site (viparyayasiddhi), he takes an argument formulated by the Avyutpatti-
vdins for their claim that not every word can be explained etymologically. 
Making use of a statement in the Vkyapadya, Dharmakrti shows that their 
argument would prove the opposite of their thesis, if the explicitly expressed 
thesis alone were the thesis. Their argument against the Vyutpattivdins, who 
claim that every word can be explained etymologically through a suitable root, 
is formulated as follows7: 
[The thesis –] the [proper] form of the word (abdarpa) has [its] object (arthavat) 
(i.e., meaning) [already] before the connection [of the word] with the named (prk 
sajñinbhisambandht) [that is, before the conventional assignment of the word to 
the named –] is that which is to be proved [by means of the reason –] because it is 
recognized [that] case-affixes [are added to the form of the word] (vibhaktidar-
ant).8 
Since the word consists of the form of the word, it seems reasonable to assume 
that in the context of this argument the form of the word is nothing but the 
word itself, in accordance with the formulation in Vkyapadya I 67, where the 
subject of the thesis is the name (sajñ). 
                     
7 See PVV 375,5f.: yath vyutpannasarvaabdavdina praty avyutpannasajñab-
davdin(1) tadarthavattvasiddhyartha sdhanam ucyate ((1)PVV1; °abddin PVV). 
8 PVin III 289a4f: (dper na) sgra’i o bo ni mi can da ’brel pa’i son rol nas don 
da ldan pa yin te / rnam par dbye ba da ldan par mtho ba’i phyir ro (1es bya ba la1) 
= Skt. ms. (MsII 35b3f.): (yath) prk sajñinbhisambandhd arthavac chabdarpa 
vibhaktidarant sdhyam (Tib.: es bya ba la has no equivalent in Skt.; in the Tibetan 
translation sdhyam is translated in the context of the succeeding phrase), see Ci'e PVV 
375,6f.: sajñisambandht prg arthavac chabdarpa vibhaktidarant tadanya-
abdavat. PVin III 288b3–291a3 (where Dharmakrti explains the term ia in the 
definition of the thesis) is translated in Tani 1984, 7–16. 
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The name has [its] form as [its] object before the connection [of the name] with the 
named; [therefore, it] becomes a cause for [the formulation of] the genitive and 
nominative cases.9 
The inference formulated by the Avyutpattivdins consists of the following 
logical elements: The property-possessor to be proved (sdhyadharmin), here-
after the subject of the thesis, is the word (abda). The reason (hetu) is the cog-
nition of case-affixes in the word (vibhaktidarana). The property to be proved 
(sdhyadharma) is the possession of its object before the connection of the 
word with the named object (prk sajñinbhisambandhd arthavattvam). The 
example (dnta) is other words which are different from the word that is the 
subject of the thesis (tadanyaabda) and which have both case-affixes and their 
objects.10 This inference is abbreviated in the following way: 
abda: (vibhaktidarana ^ prk sajñinbhisambandhd arthavattvam) (tadanya-
abda) [1] 
In order to grasp the intended content of the Avyutpattivdins’ argument we 
must presuppose their view that if the word, for example a name, before its 
connection with the named object, had no other object, it could not be called a 
noun-base (prtipadika); therefore, no case-affixes could be added to the 
word.11 On the contrary, when the word has a case-affix, it is a noun base and 
has its object. Now, at the beginning of Pini’s S	tras the definition of the 
term vddhi runs as follows: vddhir daic. The word vddhi has the nominative 
case-affix, and thus is a noun-base, which means it must have the named as its 
                     
9 VP I 67: prk sajñinbhisambandht sajñ rpapadrthik / ahy ca pratha-
my ca nimittatvya kalpate // (the numbering of the verse follows Rau 2002), trans-
lated in Iyer 1965, 69; Akamatsu 1998, 124; Ogawa 1999, 33; Rau 2002, 16. I would 
like to express my thanks to Prof. Ogawa who kindly gave me detailed information on 
the relationship between the word and its object in the Vkyapadya. 
10 See Dh 20a8–b1 = Skt. ms. 16a2f.: sajñinbhisambandht prk sajñabdasyr-
thavattva sdhyam. vibhaktidarand iti hetu	. bhyapadrthako vibhaktyanta	(1) 
abdo(2) dnta	 ((1)Tib.: rnam par dbye (rnams dbye P D 17b1) ba’i mtha’ can … .  
(2)abdo(?) ms.), PVV 375,6f. 
11 See VPV [ad VP I 67] 125,5–7: yvat sajñin tu sajñ na sambaddh tvan na 
sajñipadrthikety arthntarbhve tasy	 prtipadikasajñbhvd vibhaktiyogo na 
syt (“Insofar as, however, the name is not connected with the named, [the name] has 
not the named as [its] object. Accordingly, if [before the connection of the name with 
the named] there were no other object [than the named], the [name would] not be called 
noun-base; therefore, no case-affix could be added [to the name. This is, actually, not 
the case since, for example, the name vddhi	 in the S	tra: vddhir daic at the begin-
ning of Pini’s S	tras has the nominative case]”), translated in Iyer 1965, 69; Aka-
matsu 1998, 124f. 
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object. The object can be the proper form (svarpa) of the word, a convention-
ally assigned meaning intended by the speaker, or it can be that which is indi-
cated by the word.12 In the case of the beginning of the S	tras, neither the 
conventional meaning “grow” nor the indicated vowels, , ai and au, are de-
termined. Accordingly, the object of the word vddhi is only the form of the 
word. Thus it is shown that the word which has a case-affix has its proper form 
as its object before its connection with the named. This is the major premise for 
their argument. In addition, according to VP I 67cd, this premise is based on a 
causal relationship in which the word’s having its proper form as its object 
enables us to recognize the formulation of case-affixes in the word. That is, the 
obvious fact that the word has case-affixes is the effect, which results from the 
cause (nimitta) that the word has its proper form as its object. Since logically 
this cause is inferred from its effect, the cause as consequence, i.e., the word’s 
possession of its own form as its object, is inferred from the effect as reason, 
i.e., the cognition of case-affixes in the word. 
Thus, according to Avyutpattivdins, their intended statement that the word 
has its proper form as its object, namely, the statement that the word has its 
object in virtue of the proper form of the word, is logically proved. Although 
they do not explicitly state their intended restriction “in virtue of the proper 
form of the word” in the inference ([1]), it is the point which they want to 
prove. For their opponent, the Vyutpattivdins, however, it is precisely the 
object to be refuted, because they insist that the word has its object not on 
account of its proper form alone but due to other external factors. Using the 
                     
12  In order to indicate the source of the Avyutpattivdins’ view that the word has its 
proper form as its object before its connection with the named, Jñnarbhadra and Bu 
ston cite Bharthari’s verse (VP III 3.1 = Jñ 280a3f. = Bu 358,2f.): jñna prayoktur 
bhyo ’rtha	 svarpa ca pratyate / abdair uccaritais te sambandha	 samava-
sthita	 // (“The cognition of the speaker, the external thing meant and the own form [of 
the word] are understood through words which are uttered. The relation of these 
(namely, the cognition, external things meant and own form) [with the words which are 
uttered] is well-established” = Houben’ translation, Houben 1995, 145, translated in 
Rau 2002, 174). According to Bharthari, for a listener who hears words there is some-
times doubt with respect to the cognition, i.e., intention, of the speaker or to the exter-
nal objects of the words, but there is no deviation with respect to their proper forms (cf. 
VP III 3.2; Houben 1995, 145ff.). That is, the relation of the words with their proper 
forms is established and does not raise a doubt in the listener’s mind. Both of Jñ and 
Bu, however, seem to understand that before the conventional assignment (*saketa) 
of the word to an object the uttered word makes known not only the proper form of the 
word but also the intention to speak, see Jñ 280a6: des na brda’i sa (P; son D 234b3) 
rol nas kya brjod par ’dod pa’i es pa da ra gi o bo (bor P D) go bar byed do //, Bu 
358,3f. 
Takashi Iwata 320
case of the etymological explanation of the word “cow” which expresses spe-
cies, Manorathanandin illustrates the Vyutpattivdins’ view that the word 
“cow” (gau	) has its object not in virtue of its proper form of the word – g, au, 
and 	 – but in virtue of the universal, cowness: 
In this case [i.e., when the word is always connected with its object]13 for the [oppo-
nent who] claims that [every word] is etymologically explained, [the following the-
sis] is proved: the word “cow” has [its] object in virtue of the external universal 
(smnya) [i.e., cowness] that is indirectly indicated by the activity (kriy) [of 
going], because, when [through the activity of going the word “cow” is etymologi-
cally explained in such a way that] on account of [the fact] that something goes it is 
[called] cow (gacchatti gau	), [the activity of going is on the one hand a cause for 
the etymological explanation14 and on the other hand together with the universal 
“cowness”] inheres in one and the same thing [i.e., each particular cow] (ekrtha-
samavya).15 However, [the thesis of the proponent, the Avyutpattivdins – the 
word “cow”] has [its] object by means of the [internal] object, which consists of the 
proper form [of the word] alone – is not [proved].16 
In the inference formulated by the Avyutpattivdins ([1]), the property to be 
proved consists merely of “possession of an object” (arthavattva), and the 
restriction “in virtue of the proper form of the word alone” is not stated. Now, 
according to the objection raised against Dharmakrti’s interpretation of the 
word ia in the definition of the thesis, namely, the objection that only that 
which is explicitly stated is the thesis, the Avyutpattivdins’ intended statement 
– the word has its object “in virtue of its proper form alone” – would not be the 
thesis, because in their inference they merely state that the word has its object 
but do not express their intended restriction “in virtue of its proper form 
alone”17 In addition, in the above-mentioned example of the etymological inter-
pretation of the word “cow” expressing species it is proved that the word which 
                     
13 See PVV1 426, n.4: nitye abdrthasambandhe. 
14 See Dh 20b1 = Skt. ms. 16a3: iha vyutpattivdino yath gamand gaur iti jtiabda	 
kriynimitta	, tath … . 
15 See NB(Dh) 39,2f.: yath gacchatti gaur iti gamanakriyy vyutpdito ’pi goab-
do gamanakriyopalakitam ekrthasamaveta gotva pravttinimittkaroti. 
16 PVV 375,7–9: atra gacchatti gaur(1) ity ekrthasamavyt kriyopalakitena bhya-
smnyenrthavn goabda	 siddho vyutpannavdina	(2), (3na tu3) svarpamtre
rthe-
nrthavn ((1)gor PVV1  (2)ms. 84b6; ’vyutpanna° PVV PVV1  (3)ms.; nanu PVV PVV1). 
17 Cf. Dh 20b3 = Skt. ms. 16a4: arthamtra coktam, (1na viea	1). tato na svar
pa-
mtre
rtha(2vac chabda2)rpam ((1)Tib.: (bye brag ni ma) smras (te /) has no equiva-
lent in Skt. (2)°vata abda° ms.); Bu 359,1: phyi rol la ma grub pa’i sgra’i ra gi o bo 
tsam gyi<s> don da ldan pa ni e ’dod yin ya ma smras pas bsgrub bya ma yin la /. 
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has case-affixes always has an external object.18 In other words, for the 
Vyutpattivdins, it is true that the reason of the Avyutpattivdins, the cognition 
of case-affixes (vibhaktidarana) in the word, leads logically to the conse-
quence explicitly stated by the Avyutpattivdins that the word has an object, 
but in reality this reason does lead to the possession of an external object, 
namely, possession of its object due to the external factors. Therefore, for the 
Avyutpattivdins it would entail an undesirable consequence that their reason 
leads to the restricted consequence, i.e., word’s possession of its object “due to 
the external factors”, and hence reverses their intended statement, viz., that the 
word has its object in virtue of its proper form alone.19 In short, provided that 
only the explicitly expressed statement were the thesis, for the Avyutpatti-
vdins their thesis would be the general statement that the word has its object 
(arthavat). Then they would be obliged to accept also a particular consequence 
which has the restriction, as far as their reason can lead to this consequence. 
Indeed their reason does lead to the restricted consequence that the word has its 
object due to the external factors. Accordingly their reason would reverse their 
intended statement that the word has its object in virtue of internal factors 
alone. This undesirable consequence results from the false assumption that only 
the proposition that is explicitly stated is the thesis, but not that which is really, 
even if implicitly, intended by the proponent. Thus, Dharmakrti proves indi-
rectly his view that the thesis to be proved consists of that which is really in-
tended by the proponent. 
                     
18 See PVV 375,10 = PVV1 426,23–25: tato dnte vibhaktyantasya vkyrtha-
vattvena(1) vyptisiddher… ((1)°vatvena PVV1 ms. 84b7; read: bhyrthavattvena(?) for 
vkyrthavattvena). 
19 See PVin III 289a5f.: ra gi o bo tsam gyis don da ldan par ni (1bsgrub par bya 
ba1) (D 191a5; ba om. P) ma yin la / don da ldan par ya (2mtho ba2) de’i phyir phyi 
rol gyi don <gyis don> da ldan pa ñid mi ’dod pa (3grub par3) ’gyur ba’am(3) / = Skt. 
ms. (MsII 35b4): na ca svarpamtrrthavat, arthavac ca, tato bhyenrthenrtha(4vat-
tvam ania syt4) (“However, [for the Avyutpattivdins their intended statement that 
the word] has [its] object in virtue of its proper form alone is not [the thesis to be 
proved, because the restriction “in virtue of its proper form alone” is not stated], in 
addition, [from their reason “cognition of case-affixes” it is proved that the word] has 
[its] object. Therefore, it would follow [for the Avyutpattivdins that] an undesirable 
[consequence] that [the word] has [its] object [only] due to an external thing.”  (1)In the 
Sanskrit context the word, sdhyam, belongs to the immediately preceding sentence.  
(2)Tib. has no equivalent in Skt.  (3)Tib. has no equivalent in Skt., although the Tibetan 
translation (mi ’dod pa grub par … ba’am /) has the same construction with that of Jñ 
280a7f. (: mi ’dod pa bsgrub pa’am /).  (4)°vatv{e?}am ania syt / MsI 37a3; °va-
tvem(?) ia syta / MsII.).  
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II.  Crvkas’ sadvityaprayoga and Dharmakrti’s refutation of their proof 
In order to show that on the basis of his interpretation of the term ia (intended 
[by the proponent]) in the definition of the thesis many pseudo-proofs can be 
refuted, Dharmakrti takes as an example the Crvkas’ formulation of the 
proof of their thesis that a pot has a second factor (sadvityaprayoga).20 Their 
inference runs as follows: 
For example, a pot (ghaa) is accompanied by a second (sadvitya) [i.e., a compan-
ion,21 or a counterpart, namely,] by either of the two (anyatara)22 – a person charac-
terized as a body to which a consciousness manifested [by the material elements] 
belongs, or a pot – because it is not a blue lotus (anutpalatva), like a wall (kuya).23 
                     
20 See PVin III 289a8: ’dis ni gñis pa da bcas pa’i sbyor ba rnams la ya(1) rjes su ’gro 
ba med pa’i ñes pa bad pa yin te / (“On account of this [i.e., the indication of the fault 
that there is no co-presence of the reason with the property to be proved in the example, 
on the basis of the interpretation of the term ia that what is intended by the proponent 
is the thesis to be proved,] the fault of no co-presence (niranvayadoa) in the case of 
the formulations [of reasons] for [the type of consequence that the subject of the thesis 
is] accompanied by a second [factor] (sadvityaprayoga) is [also] explained.”  (1)ya has 
no equivalent in Skt. MsII 35b5, MsI 37a5), PV IV 34abc'; Watanabe 1977, 197, Tille-
mans 2000, 57f. 
21 See Dh 21a3f.: de dag las ga ya ru bas gñis pa da bcas pa ste zla bo da bcas 
pa’o // = Skt. ms. 16b3: tayor anyatare
a sadvitya sasahya	; Tillemans 2000, 58, n. 
209. 
22 Literally: a pot has a second (a companion) in the form of either of the two, see Tille-
mans 2000, 58f. I follow kyabuddhi’s paraphrase of the compound anyatarasadvit-
ya, cf. PV() 316a8 (ad PVP 329a3f., PV IV 34): de dag las ga ya ru ba ste bum 
pa da skyes bu gñis pa da bcas par ’jug pa’i phyir gñis pa da bcas pa’o // – Ci' 
PVV1 Appendix 526,13f. (= Steinkellner 1981, 293,8f. = Tillemans 1991, 416,25): 
tayor anyatare
a ghaena purue
a v saha dvityena vartata iti sadvitya	(1) (“Because 
[the vase] exists together with (saha) a ‘second’ (dvitya) which is either of the two, 
viz. the vase or the person, it is said to be sadvitya” (translation in Tillemans 1991, 
417) (1)ca dvitya	 in text). 
23 PVin III 289a8–b1 – Ci' PVBh 496,31–497,1: yathbhivyakta(1)caitanyaarralaka-

apuruaghanyatarasadvitiyo ghaa	, anutpalatvt(2), kuyavad iti ((1)ms. 246a6; 
yath vibhakta° in text  (2)ms.; anutpana(?nna)tvt in text. See Watanabe 1977, 194 & 
205, n.1; Steinkellner 1981, 292,26–293,1; Tani 1984, 9, n. 16; Tillemans 1991, 416, 
3ff.; Tillemans 2000, 58 & n. 210); Ci' SyVR 538,23f. (Watanabe 1992, 660); Ci'e 
PVV 375,16 (anutpalatvt (ms. 85a1; anutpannatvt PVV PVV1 427,7)); Ci'e NBh	
 
228,5f. PVin III (289b1) reads: mon par gsal (D 191b1; bsal P) ba’i sems pa (D; om. 
P) can; gñis pa da bcas pa (P; pas D) yin te /. For translations of the passage of the sa-
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This inference consists of the following elements: 
subject of the thesis (sdhyadharmin): a pot (ghaa) 
reason (hetu): being not a blue lotus (anutpalatva) 
property to be proved (sdhyadharma): being accompanied by a second, i.e., either 
a person or a pot (puruaghanyatarasadvityatva) 
example (dnta): a wall (kuya) 
ghaa: (anutpalatva ^ puruaghanyatarasadvityatva) (kuya) [2] 
From the standpoint of the Crvkas, the pervasion, according to Dharmottara’s 
commentary, can be explained in the following way: the co-presence of the 
reason and the property to be proved is established, because it is illustrated by a 
wall which is not a blue lotus and is accompanied by either of the two, namely, 
a pot. The co-absence of the reason and the property to be proved is also estab-
lished, because it is illustrated by the ether on the basis of the idea that real 
properties belong only to entities, not to what does not exist at all. That is, the 
property to be proved, being accompanied by a second, and the reason, being 
not a blue lotus, i.e., being something other than a blue lotus,24 are real proper-
ties and hence are absent in that which is not the entity. The ether, also, is not 
the entity; therefore, in it both the reason and the property to be proved are ab-
sent: 
Further, when [the property to be proved] “being accompanied by a second, 
[namely,] either a pot or a person” is excluded from those [dissimilar instances, for 
example,] the ether and so on, which are not entities, then [the reason] “being not a 
blue lotus” also is excluded from them, since [the reason in the sense of “being 
something other than a blue lotus”] has the entity as [its] essence. In a wall [as a 
similar instance], in contrast, both [reason and property to be proved] can [be pre-
sent]. Therefore, the positive concomitance and negative concomitance (anvayavya-
tireka) are established.25 
                     
dvityaprayoga see Tani 1984, 9ff. and Watanabe 1992, 672ff.; for a detailed explana-
tion of the refutation of this proof see Tillemans 1991, 406ff.; Tillemans 2000, 58ff. 
24 See Dh 21a4f. = Skt. ms. 16b3f.: anutpalatvt, utpald anyatvd iti hetvartha	, Bu 
360,5 (s. note 25). 
25 Dh 21a5f. = Skt. ms. 16b4: yata ckder(1) avastuno(2) ghaapurunyatarasadvit-
yatva vyvttam(3), tato(4) <’>nutpalatvam api vasturpa vyvttam, kuye tu dvayor 
api sambhava(5) ity anvayavyatirekasiddhi	 ((1)Tib. has no equivalent in ca  (2)avastuna	 
ms.  (3)vyv(?)m ms.  (4)Tib.: de ñid las  (5)Tib.: yod pa), Dh 21a6–8 is translated in 
Tillemans 2000, 61, n.215. See also Bu 360,4f.: bum pa da ldan pa’i rtsig pa la ga 
ru gi spyi’i gñis bcas su grub ci / rtags u tpa la ma yin pa’a yod pa’i (pas ?) rjes 
’gro grub / nam mkha’ la sogs pa <las>(?) ga ru gi gñis bcas log pa la u tpa la las 
gan pa’i dos po’a log pas ldog pa grub ci /. 
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Thus, the positive and negative concomitances, the Crvkas insist, are estab-
lished, and the first condition for the valid reason – that the reason “being not a 
blue lotus” is a property of the subject of the thesis “pot” – is also satisfied.26 
Accordingly their consequence “A pot is accompanied by a second, namely, 
either a person characterized as a body or a pot” can be derived by the reason. 
Further, according to the context, the pot is accompanied merely by the person, 
since the pot can not be accompanied by itself.27 Therefore, the existence of the 
person characterized as a body is proved.28 This is the outline of the Crvkas’ 
formulation of the reason for the property to be proved “being accompanied by 
a second” (sadvityaprayoga). From this they deduce that there is no rebirth for 
the materialist version of a person, since such a person does not exist after the 
death of the body. 
 If their thesis – a pot is accompanied by a second, namely either the object 
that they intend to prove or a pot – were correctly proved, it would be possible 
for them to prove the existence of any object that they wish to establish: since a 
pot is accompanied not by the pot itself, they will surely have it accompanied 
by their wished object. Yet such a thesis is in reality not faultless. Its faults can 
be easily pointed out through a quick survey. When the Crvkas make no 
mention of the person as a second factor and prove quite generally that a pot is 
accompanied by a second, which can be anything, this conclusion is self-
evident.29 The proof is useless because they cannot establish their intended 
materialist version of persons. Even if, on the contrary, intending to establish 
the person characterized as a body, they prove that a pot is accompanied by the 
person, there is a fault: the property to be proved – being accompanied by the 
person – is not present in the example, a wall, because the materialist’s type of 
person itself is doubtful for the Buddhist opponent (see II.1). Thus, they fail to 
                     
26 See Dh 21a6 = Skt. ms. 16b5: anutpalatva pakadharma eva(1) ((1)Tib. has no 
equivalent in eva). 
27 See Dh 21a7 = Skt. ms. 16b5f.: (1ghaas tu na ghaenaiva sadvitya(2)1) iti smar-
thyt(3) tathbh
tena puruea bhaviyati ((1)Tib.: bum pa ñid ni bum pa gñis (P; ñid D 
18a6) pa da bcas pa yod pa. Tib.: ñid has no equivalent in Skt; na (n{}a ms.) om. in 
Tib.  (2)dvitya ms.  (3)smrthyt ms.). 
28 See Tillemans 2000, 59f. 
29 Cf. Dh 21b1f. = Skt. ms. 16b7–17a1 (ad PVin III 289b2 – Ci' PVBh 497,22): tasya(1) 
vieasynkepe sdhanasya na kicit phalam, yena kenacit sadvityatva yata	 
siddham(2) ((1)tasya om. in Tib.  (2)siddham{i} ms.) (“If they do not hint at the particular 
[i.e., being accompanied by the person as a second], there is no benefit of the proof be-
cause it is [already] proved that [a pot] is accompanied by a second, namely, an arbi-
trary [thing]”); SyVR 539,6f. = Watanabe 1992, 662f.: aparatra tu siddhasdhanam, 
yena kenacit sadvityatvasya siddhatvt. 
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establish that which they really intend to prove, even if their inference, as far as 
what is expressed explicitly is concerned, appears to be formally valid. 
The point of their argument is as follows: when they ascertain the pervasion 
of the reason by the property to be proved, they make use of the example, the 
wall, which is nothing to do with what they really intend to prove. From a 
strategic point of view, they merely show that the wall as the example is 
accompanied by the pot as a second, but they do not allude to their intended 
property to be proved – being accompanied by the person as a companion – in 
order that the latter may not be negated by the opponent. Dharmakrti claims 
that this kind of thesis, in principle, can be refuted by means of his own inter-
pretation of the word “intended [by the proponent]” (ia) in the definition of 
the thesis, namely by the rule that what is really intended to be proved is the 
thesis, but not what is merely expressed. 
It is true that as long as one’s aim is the general one of refuting the Crv-
kas’ thesis, one may assume that their thesis can be easily refuted. But the logi-
cal invalidation of their argument is not as easy as one expects. In PV IV 
Dharmakrti takes the Crvkas’ sadvityaprayoga as an example to show that 
their proof can be invalidated on the basis of his own interpretation of the word 
“intended” (ia) in the definition of the thesis. Further, he gives a full account 
of the refutation of their inference in PVin III. Light has been shed on that 
inference in papers by Watanabe 1977 (197ff.); Steinkellner 1981 (293f.) made 
available a Sanskrit fragment of kyabuddhi that was found in Vibh	tican-
dra’s appendix to Pram
avrttikavtti; T. J. F. Tillemans has examined Dhar-
makrti’s refutation of the sadvityaprayoga in PV IV; Tani 1984 and Watanabe 
(1992) give translations of the relevant passage in PVin III. Tillemans’ study 
based on PV IV has elucidated the core of this issue. 
What remains to be done is an analysis of Dharmakrti’s description in PVin 
III. In order to get a glimpse of the fundamental idea of his description we need 
to refer to commentaries, among which Dharmottara’s extensive discussion in 
his commentary on PVin helpfully clarifies the logical structure of the refuta-
tion of the Crvkas’ inference. Dharmottara’s interpretation has been partially 
examined in previous papers. In the following I shall analyze Dharmakrti’s 
refutation, mainly on the basis of Dharmottara’s commentary. 
Before doing so, let us be clear about the limitations which context imposes 
on the terms, anyatara and dvitya, in regard to the property to be proved of 
“being accompanied by a second, namely, either of the two” (anyatarasadvit-
yatva), in order for this property to be established. These will help us to under-
stand the points of Dharmakrti’s refutation. 
According to the Crvkas’ thesis, the subject of the thesis exists together with a 
second, its companion or counterpart, which is either of the two. [3.a] 
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In this context, either of the two (anyatara) is a second (dvitya), that is, either a pot 
or a person characterized as a body is a second factor for the subject of the thesis 
(sdhyadharmin), namely a pot. [3.a.1] 
Since the companion, or the counterpart, is different from the accompanied, either 
of the two (anyatara) as the counterpart for the subject of the thesis is a thing other 
than (arthntara) the subject of the thesis, the pot.30 [3.a.2] 
Further, the property to be proved – being accompanied by a second (dvitya), 
namely, either of the two (anyatara) – must be present not only in the subject of the 
thesis (sdhyadharmin) but also in the example, namely, the subject of the exempli-
fication (dntadharmin). That is, anyatara’s being a second, contextually implied 
by the thesis, holds for both of these subjects (dharmin). [3.b] 
Therefore, the statement that either of the two (anyatara) is a second means that an-
yatara is a second (dvitya) for both dharmins, namely, both the subject of the thesis 
and the example. [3.b.1] 
That either of the two is a second (i.e., companion) for both dharmins means that 
either of the two is different from both dharmins. Accordingly, either of the two 
(anyatara) must be a thing other (arthntara) than the subject of the thesis and the 
example.31  [3.b.2]    
In short, from their thesis – X (dharmin) is accompanied by Y (anyatara) – the 
following statement is implied: 
Y (either their intended object or the subject of the thesis) is a thing other than X 
(the subject of the thesis and the subject of the exemplification). Concretely: 
Y (either the person or the pot) is a thing other than X (the pot and the wall) [3.b.2'] 
This shows that the determination of the alternative member referred to by the 
word anyatara is dependent on the dharmins. That is, their property to be 
proved, which includes anyatara, is regulated by the subject of the thesis and 
the subject of the exemplification. This is one reason for the complexity of the 
thesis. 
Dharmakrti claims that at least one of these limitations cannot hold in their 
inference. In his refutation of their inference, he divides the property to be 
proved (sdhyadharma) into two types – the particular property to be proved 
and the universal property to be proved – and indicates faults in these two 
forms of the thesis. 
                     
30 See PVin III 289b5–7 (for a translation see II.2.1). 
31 See Dh 23a7f. = Skt. ms. 18b2ff. (ad PVin III 290a2–b1), Bu 364,6f. (ad PVin III 
290a2); note 44. 
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II.1. Refutation of the particular property to be proved (sdhyadharma) of the 
sadvityaprayoga 
The point about Dharmakrti’s refutation of the particular property to be proved 
consists in the following argument: No matter what member is referred to by 
the word anyatara, it is not possible to show that the property to be proved – 
“being accompanied by a second, namely either of the two (anyatara), a person 
or a pot” – is present in both of the subjects (dharmin), the pot and the wall. 
Seen from the angle of anyatara, be it the person or the pot, the limitation – 
that anyatara’s being a second (i.e., companion) holds for both subjects ([3.b]), 
namely, anyatara is a companion of the pot and the wall – is not satisfied. In 
other words, the limitation ([3.b.2]) – anyatara (i.e., the person or the pot) is a 
thing other than the pot and the wall – is not satisfied. 
As for the negation of their thesis in the case where the word anyatara refers 
to the pot concretely, it is clear that their thesis – the pot as the subject of the 
thesis is accompanied by a second, the pot referred to by the word anyatara – 
does not hold. The point is as follows: in order for the pot as the subject of the 
thesis to be accompanied by a thing as its companion, as stated in [3.a.2], these 
two, the companion and the accompanied, must be different from each other, 
but this cannot be satisfied in the present case since it is obviously contradic-
tory that the pot (i.e., the companion referred to by the word anyatara) is a 
thing other than the pot (i.e., the accompanied, the subject of the thesis).32 For 
this reason the limitation ([3.b.2]) – anyatara (i.e., the pot) is a thing other than 
the pot and the wall – cannot be satisfied either; therefore, when anyatara is the 
pot, their thesis – a pot is accompanied by anyatara as a second – does not 
hold. 
When the Crvkas intend to prove the existence of the person characterized 
as a body, that is, when the word anyatara refers to the person concretely, then, 
according to the limitation ([3.b]) – the property to be proved must be present 
not only in the subject of the thesis but also in the example –, the property to be 
proved, being accompanied by anyatara, i.e., the person as a second, must be 
present also in the example, the wall, namely, the wall must be accompanied by 
the person. But this is not proved: 
                     
32 Cf. PVin III 289b7: bum pa ra ñid kyis don gan gyi o bor khas ma blas pa’i 
phyir … (for a translation see II.2.1 below); Dh 23a1 = Skt. ms. 18a4: ghad ghao 
nrthntaram(1) ((1)nrthntara{d} ms.) – Ci'e SyVR 539,21 (= Watanabe 1992, 669); 
PVV 375,25–376,7: na hi ghaa	 svarpe
aivnyatarasadvitya	, ibid. 376,9. See also 
Tillemans 2000, 59, (c). 
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[There is a fault of no co-presence of the property to be proved and the reason] 
because it is not established (asiddhi) that the wall is accompanied by a second, 
namely, a person of such a nature.33 
The reason why the wall is not accompanied by the person, according to 
Jñnarbhadra, is the fact that such a material person who is one and the same 
with the body is doubtful for the Buddhist, and hence the presence of the prop-
erty to be proved – “being accompanied by the person” – in the example, the 
wall, is doubtful.34 Even the Crvkas illustrate in their indication of the exam-
ple that the wall as the example is accompanied by the pot, which is a second 
factor for the wall, but it is not accompanied by the person taken in the materi-
alist fashion. 
II. 2.  Refutation of the universal property to be proved of the sadvityapra-
yoga 
The Crvkas may counter that their thesis consists not of the specific but of 
the universal property to be proved. Dharmakrti refutes this objection in detail 
in PVin III (289b2ff.). At first glance his description seems to be verbose 
because of the repetitive treatment of similar topics. However, when one refers 
to Dharmottara’s detailed and illuminating interpretation one is forced to 
change one’s attitude entirely. As will be shown later, Dharmakrti treats the 
issue from two different angles and describes it quite systematically. In the 
following I shall trace his argument in PVin III on the basis of Dharmottara’s 
commentary. In order to interpret Dharmakrti’s refutation of the Crvkas’ 
                     
33 PVin III 289b1f.: rtsig pa ni de lta bur gyur pa’i skyes bus gñis pa da bcas par (P; 
pa D 191b2) ma grub pa(1) (bin no //) ((1)ma grub pa for °asiddhe	 MsII 35b6). Cf. 
Ci'e SyVR 539,1f. = Watanabe 1992, 661: (1atha prayoge1) tathbhtena purue
a 
tath(1) kuy(1dau1) sadvityatvsiddher anvayadoa	(1) ((1)Skt. has no equivalent in 
Tib.; read ananvayadoa	 or niranvayadoa	 for anvayadoa	, cf. Dh 21a7–b1 = Skt. 
ms. 16b6f.: … tathbh
tenety abhivyaktacaitanyena sadvityatvam … kuyasya yato 
na sidhyati, tato ’<na>nvayadoa	 (Tib.: rjes su ’gro ba med pa’i skyon du ’gyur ba) 
and PV() 316b4f. (ad PV IV 34ab) – Ci' PVV1 Appendix 526,20 = Steinkellner 
1981, 293,15f. = Tillemans 1991, 416,31: tasya (i.e., puruasya) csiddhatvd dnte 
’nanvayadoa	). 
34 See Jñ 280b8–281a1: de lta bur gyur pa (tathbhtena) … skyes bus (purue
a) gñis 
pa can du ma grub (sadvityatvsiddhe	) ste / lus (arra) ni sems (caitanya) las tha mi 
dad par (*abheda) the tshom za ba’i phyir ro // de ltar na sems gsal (P; bsal D 235a4) 
ba’i lus (abhivyaktacaitanyaarra) gñis pa can (sadvitya) es bya ba bsgrub par bya 
ba’i chos (sdhyadharma) la the tshom za ba’i phyir dper (dnta) mi ’gyur ro //; 
Tillemans 2000, 60. 
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thesis in a logically persuasive way we need to make a preliminary observation. 
First let us clarify the assumptions necessary for the property anyatarasadvit-
yatva to be a universal property to be proved and then analyze Dharmakrti’s 
refutation of the thesis. 
The Crvkas’ inference is clearly open to criticism, but we encounter diffi-
culties when we begin to demonstrate its failures. These difficulties stem from 
at least two points. The first is the above-mentioned relationship between two 
members referred to by the word anyatara and two subjects (dharmin). That is, 
the word “a second” (dvitya) in the property to be proved, anyatarasadvit-
yatva, means that anyatara – i.e., either the subject of the thesis or the person – 
is a second for the subject of the thesis and the subject of the exemplification 
(see [3.b.1]). From this a characteristic feature of their thesis becomes clear: the 
subject itself is included in the description of the property to be proved, 
namely, both in anyatara and dvitya, in a complicated way. This makes it dif-
ficult to grasp the thesis. The second difficulty is the ambiguity of the word an-
yatara, which, as we shall see later, not only means the alternative but also 
presupposes conditions which include the modal concept of possibility (sam-
bhava). The latter is connected with the concept of indeterminacy (aniyama) or 
determination (niyama) in the sense of necessity as its counterpart. A proper 
understanding of Dharmakrti’s refutation of their thesis by means of these 
concepts requires us to analyze the presupposed conditions thoroughly. If we 
do not know exactly what the Crvkas mean by the word anyatara, it will 
seem that Dharmakrti’s refutation is almost a repetition of the same argument. 
As for the solution of the first difficulty, the above-mentioned limitations 
which are contextually placed on the terms, anyatara, dvitya, and the subject 
(see [3.a], [3.b], and so on), will give us a clue to disentangle the complicated 
relationship between anyatara and two subjects. Since these limitations hold in 
general in the context of their thesis, they can be regarded as general assump-
tions necessary for their thesis taken as a universal. As for handling the second 
difficult problem, the ambiguity of the meaning of the word anyatara, it is 
worth noting that Dharmottara makes clear that the word “either of the two” 
(anyatara) has two meanings: 
When, further, the word ‘either of the two’ is [used] for the purpose of indicating 
the possibility of an object of establishment (vidhiviayasambhava), [for example, 
the proposition that] either Devadatta or Yajñadatta is to be provided with meals 
means that either of the two can be a person for whom the provision of meals is es-
tablished, [that is, it indicates a person who can be provided with meals], then the 
word ‘either of the two’ is significant, when it is [merely] possible that even one [of 
the two] is provided with meals (ekasypi bhojanasambhave). 
When, on the contrary, the word ‘either of the two’ is used in the sense of indicating 
the indeterminacy (aniyama) with respect to the object of providing meals that is to 
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be established (vidheyabhojanaviaya) under [the condition] that [on the one hand] 
it is possible to establish that both of the two are provided with meals [and on the 
other hand] that the provision of meals is to be established in an indeterminate way 
(aniyamena), then the [the word ‘either of the two’] is significant when it is possible 
to establish that both of them are provided with meals (dvayor api bhojanavidhna-
sambhave). And this difference is to be understood from implication, the context of 
the discussion, and so on, in the mundane usage [of the word].35 
According to this passage, the word anyatara in the context of the sadvitya-
prayoga is used in the following two senses: 
An undetermined (aniyata) one of the two (dvayor ekam)36 is a second ([4.a]) under 
the condition that, although both of the members referred to by the word anyatara 
are able to be a second factor ([4.a.1]), there is no determination which of the two is 
a second ([4.a.2]).  [4.a] [4.a.1] [4.a.2] 
It is possible for either of the two to be a second factor. [4.b] 
In the former case the word anyatara indicates the indeterminacy (aniyama) 
with respect to the object to be established; in the latter case it indicates the 
possibility (sambhava) of an alternative object to be established. For the sake of 
simplicity we may express two meanings of the word anyatara as follows: 
undetermined one of the two [4.a'] 
possible one of the two [4.b'] 
Dharmottara’s remark is all the more noteworthy for his indication of the con-
ditions necessary for the usage of the word anyatara. In the first place, the 
                     
35 Dh 24b8–25a4 = Skt. ms. 20a1–4 (ad PVin III 290a8): anyataragraha
a ca yad 
vidhiviayasambhavakhypanrtha(1) devadattayajñadattayor anyataro bhojanyo 
(2nyatarabhojanyo vidhi	2)(sic) sambhavatty artha	, tadaikasypi bhojanasambhave 
<’>nyataraabda	 samartha	(3). dvayor bhojanavidhisambhave tv aniyamena bhojane 
vidheye <’>nyataraabdo (4vidheyabhojana4)viayniyamakhypane vartate, tad dva-
yor api(5) bhojanavidhnasambhave samartha	. aya ca pravibhgo laukike prayoge 
’rthaprakara
der anugantavya	 ((1)vidhiviasambhava° ms.  (2)Tib. 25a1: (zan sbyin 
par bya ba yin no es bya ba) zan sbyin pa sgrub pa’i yul ga ya ru ba (srid do es 
bya ba’i don yin pa), read: ’nyataro bhojanavidhiviaya	(?).  (3)sa{rtha}martha	 ms.  
(4)Tib. 25a2f.: zan za bar bsgrub (D 21b4; bsgrubs P) pa’i (yul)  (5)api om. in Tib.), see 
also Bu 367,3: za ba sgrub pa’i yul srid par ston pa’i ga ru gi sgra ni gcig za ya nus 
la / gñis ka za ba srid pa es pa med par sgrub pa’i ga ru gi sgra ni gñis ka za sird na 
nus pa yin i de’a skabs da ugs kyis es par bya’o //. 
36 See Dh 22b3f. = Skt. ms. 17b7: (1anyataraabdo1) hi (2dvayor ekam aniyatam ha2) 
((1)Tib.: ga ya ru ba’i (ba ni P D19b1) sgra ni  (2)Tib.: gcig tu ma es par gñi ga 
brjod (D 19b1; rjod P) pa yin pas). 
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word anyatara in the sense of the indeterminacy as to which of two members is 
a second (see [4.a]) is not significant if it is not so that both of the members can 
be a second. That is to say,  
The possibility for both of two members to be a second is the necessary condition 
for the indeterminacy with respect to one of the two. In other words, the indetermi-
nacy implies the possibility for both of the two to be a second. [5.a] 
In the second place, the possibility for either of the two to be a second ([4.b]) 
makes sense only if it is merely possible that one of the two is a second: 
The fact that one of the two at least can be a second is the necessary condition for 
the possibility for either of the two to be a second. In other words, the possibility for 
either of the two to be a second implies that one of the two at least can be a second. 
 [5.b]    
Through these two meanings of the word anyatara together with their neces-
sary conditions, according to Dharmottara, one can explain the universality of 
the Crvkas’ thesis; thus, they are regarded as an assumption necessary for the 
universality of their thesis. 
While Dharmakrti describes his refutation of their thesis taken as a univer-
sal briefly in PV IV, he has a long excursus on the refutation in PVin III. Ana-
lyzing this, we find that Dharmottara’s interpretation of the word anyatara in 
two ways is helpful. Thanks to this indication of two meanings of the word an-
yatara, we can grasp Dharmakrti’s two exegetical stances on his refutation of 
their thesis: in the first part of his refutation (PVin III 289b5–290a2) the former 
meaning ([4.a]) is assumed, while in the second part (PVin III 290a2–8) the 
latter meaning ([4.b]). This enables us to see that his excursus is not a repetition 
of similar refutations but reflects a systematic aim to refute the Crvkas’ thesis 
from two angles that are based on two meanings of the word anyatara. 
II.2.1. Refutation of their thesis taken as a universal, i.e., anyatarasadvityatva, on 
the basis of the first meaning of the word anyatara, i.e., indeterminacy with 
respect to one of the two ([4.a], [4.a'])  
Suppose that we rely upon the first meaning of the word anyatara, i.e., “an 
undetermined one of the two” ([4.a']) and the necessary condition contextually 
implied by indeterminacy ([4.a.1], [5.a]), i.e., “it is possible for both of the 
members to be …”, in the above-mentioned limitation ([3.b.2]). We can then 
derive the following statements from the Crvkas’ thesis taken as a universal: 
It is possible for both of the members which are referred to by the word anyatara, 
namely, the person and the pot, to be a second factor for both subjects (dharmin), 
that is, for the two members it is possible to be a thing other than both subjects. 
 [4.a.1'] 
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An undetermined one of the two is a thing other than both subjects. In other words, 
there is no determination which of the two is a thing other than the subject.  [4.a.2'] 
The latter statement ([4.a.2']) implies the following statement: 
The member (referred to by the word anyatara), which is a thing other than (ar-
thntara) the subject (dharmin), is variable in accordance with the difference 
whether the subject is the subject of the thesis (sdhyadharmin) or the subject of the 
exemplification (dntadharmin).37 Seen from the viewpoint of the qualification 
of anyatara “a thing other than” (arthntara), its content “a thing other than the 
subject” varies according to which member of the two is referred to by the word an-
yatara.  [4.a.3] 
We shall show later an inconsistency in their thesis on the grounds that this 
statement ([4.a.3]) is contrary to another statement which is implied by the uni-
versality of the thesis. 
In order to refute their thesis based on the first meaning of the word anya-
tara, i.e., indeterminacy with respect to one of the two ([4.a']), one needs 
merely to negate the necessary condition for the usage of the word anyatara 
([5.a]), namely, the possibility for both of the two to be a second. Indeed, 
according to Dharmottara’s interpretation, the chief target of Dharmakrti’s 
refutation of the Crvkas’ thesis is the statement that both of the members 
referred to by the word anyatara can be a thing other than both subjects 
([4.a.1']). Dharmakrti indicates that their thesis does not hold on the grounds 
that it is not the case that both of the members can be a second, that is, on the 
grounds that one of the two cannot be a second for both subjects. Concretely: 
one of the two, the body which is nothing but the person, cannot be a thing 
other than the subject of the thesis, the pot: 
Further (ca), even the general establishment (smnyenpi sdhanam) [of their 
property to be proved, being accompanied by a second (sadvitya), i.e., either a pot 
or a body,] is not possible, when it is not accepted (anabhyupagama) that a body of 
this sort [i.e., the body that has consciousness which is manifested by the material 
elements,] is a thing other than the pot [as the subject of the thesis]. It is because 
[the indispensable condition for establishing the thesis taken as a universal –] either 
of the two [i.e., the pot or the person,] is a thing other [than the pot as the subject of 
the thesis] (anyatarrthntarabhva) – is not [satisfied, as long as the existence of 
such a material person is doubtful]. When namely it is possible that both of the two 
[i.e., the pot and the body,] are so [, that is, a thing other than the subject of the 
thesis, i.e., the pot] (dvayor hi tathbhvasambhave), the word “either of the two” 
can [have a proper meaning] (anyatarokti	 samarth), for example, when [it is said] 
“Provide either Devadatta or Yajñadatta with meals” (devadattayajñadattayor 
                     
37 See Dh 25a4–6; note 42. 
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anyatara bhojaya), [the word anyatara can have a proper meaning when both of 
the two can be provided with meals, but it can] not when it is not possible to 
provide one [of the two] with meals (naikasya bhojansambhave), or it is not 
wished (ankk) [to provide one of the two with meals].38 
The example illustrates that when it is possible to establish that both Devadatta 
and Yajñadatta are provided with meals, then we can establish that an 
undetermined one of the two persons is provided with meals, and thus the word 
anyatara will have a proper meaning. Since in this context the word anyatara 
means an undetermined (aniyata) one of the two ([4.a']), it is presupposed, as in 
the case ([4.a.1]), that both of them have the possibility to be provided with 
meals. Therefore, if an arbitrary one of the two could not be provided with 
meals because of certain causes, the word anyatara could not have a proper 
meaning.39 In the case of the Crvkas’ thesis also, for the universality of their 
thesis it is essential that both of the members referred to by the word anyatara 
could be established as a second factor for the subject of the thesis and a thing 
other than this subject (see [4.a.1']), otherwise the thesis would not hold. 
However, this condition ([4.a.1']) is not satisfied, for it is certain that for one of 
the two, i.e., the body, there is no possibility to be a second, since a body of 
which the existence is doubtful cannot be a second factor for the pot and hence 
cannot be a thing other than the pot; thus, the thesis taken as a universal cannot 
be established. 
                     
38 PVin III 289b5–7: (3(2(1rnam pa de lta bu’i lus1) bum pa las don gan gyi o bor khas 
mi len na spyi sgrub pa ya mi srid de /2) ga ya ru ba’i don gan gyi o bo med pa’i 
phyir ro //3) (4gñi ga de lta bu’i dos por srid na ga ya ru ba brjod par nus pa yin te / 
dper na lha sbyin (D 191b6; lhas byin P) da mchod sbyin (5ga ya ru ba ig za’o5) 
(P; pa’o D) es bya ba lta bu yin gyi / (6ga ya ru ba gcig6) (D; cig P) za mi srid 
pa’am ’dod pa med na ni (P; om. D) ma yin no //4). (1)Skt. ms. (MsII 36a1): tathvidha-
sya ca dehasya (ca om. in Tib.)   (2)Cf. SyVR 539,14–16 (= Watanabe 1992, 666f.): … 
katha smnyasya sdhana sambhavati. … puruasya … ghad arthntarabhvn-
abhyupagamena … .  (3)Cf. PV IV 35ab: tad (i.e., sadvityatvam) evrthntarbhvd 
dehnptau na sidhyati /; Tillemans 2000, 58 & n.208.  (4)Cf. Ci'e SyVR 539,16–20 
(=Watanabe 1992, 667–669): dvayor hi tathbhvasambhave ’nyatarokti	 samarth 
bhavati, yath devadattayajñadattayor anyatara bhojayed iti. … na … ekatarasya 
bhojansambhave … ankky v.  (5)Tib.: ga ya ru ba ig za’o for Skt. ms. 
(MsII 36a2): anyatara bhojaya.  (6)Tib.: ga ya ru ba gcig for Skt. ms.: ekasya 
(bhojansambhave). 
39 See Dh 22b4–6 = Skt. ms. 18a1f. (ad PVin III 289b6): yathetydi. devadattayajña-
dattayor api bhojanavidhisambhave hy aniyata ekasmin(1) (2bhojana vidhyate2), tato 
<’>nyatarokti	 sagatrth. na punar ekatarasya(3) kutacin nimittd bhojansam-
bhave … ((1)ekasmina ms.  (2)Tib. 22b5: brjod pa  (3)Tib.: gcig (za bar mi srid pa’am)); 
Ci'e SyVR 539,18–20, Watanabe 1992, 668f. 
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In his refutation of the statement ([4.a.1']) Dharmakrti proves that one of 
two members referred to by the word anyatara cannot be a second factor for 
the subject. This means the negation of the possibility for one of the two to be a 
second, and hence the negation of the possibility for both of the two to be a 
second. When the latter possibility for both of the two to be a second, i.e., the 
necessary condition for the indeterminacy with respect to one of the two ([5.a]), 
is negated, then the indeterminacy itself is negated. That is, the statement – 
there is no determination with respect to which of the two is a second factor 
([4.a.2]) or is a thing other than the subject ([4.a.2']) – is negated. From this 
angle also, it is proved that the Crvkas’ insistence on the universal property 
to be proved, anyatarasadvityatva, can be negated. For when a pot is the 
subject of the thesis, their statement that a pot is accompanied by a second, 
either a pot or a person – in other words, that either of the two, a pot or a 
person, is a thing other than the accompanied pot – has the determination 
(niyama) with respect to being a thing other than the pot in the sense that not 
the pot but only the person characterized as a body is a thing other than the pot, 
so that the condition for the universal thesis, the indeterminacy with respect to 
one of the two, is not satisfied: 
For the following reason, too, it is not [possible] that either of the two is a thing 
other than [the subject]: On the grounds that it is not accepted that the pot [referred 
to by the word anyatara] is a thing other than itself (ghaasya svato ’rthntarabh-
vsynabhyupagamt) and it is [otherwise] contradictory (virodha), the meaning of 
the sentence (vkyrtha) [which has the determination with respect to a second 
factor] is fixed (vyavasthna) by way of implication (smarthyena) in such a way 
that [of the pot and the body] only the body would be a thing other [than the pot as 
the subject of the thesis] (deha evrthntarabhta	);40 consequently, the word 
“either of the two” (anyataragraha
a) [taken generally] is meaningless (aprtha-
ka).41 
Insofar as the word anyatara definitely refers to a certain object of the two 
within the context of their statement, it is senseless to use the word in order to 
imply the indeterminacy with respect to an object to be established. 
                     
40 See Dh 23a1 = Skt. ms. 18a4f.: tasmd(1) deha(2) evrthntarabh
ta iti dvityatvani-
yamo vkyrtho <’>vatihate ((1)desmd ms.  (2)Tib.: lus (D 19b6; lus de P)). 
41 PVin III 289b7f.: ’di las kya ga ya ru ba don gan gyi o bo med pa yin te / bum 
pa ra ñid kyis don gan gyi o bor khas ma blas pa’i phyir da ’gal ba’i phyir / (P; 
phyir ro // D 191b7) ugs kyis lus ñid kyi don gan du gyur pa yin no es ag gi don du 
rnam par gnas pa’i phyir (D; om. P) ga ya ru ba es smos pa ni don med do //. Cf. 
SyVR 539,21–23 (= Watanabe 1992, 669): api ca na ghad ghao ’rthntaram. … etac 
caikasmin viruddham iti yathoktapurua evnyataro ’peya	 (read: °tara upeya	(?)). 
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II.2.2. Refutation of the Crvkas’ thesis taken as a universal on the basis of the 
second meaning of the word anyatara, i.e., the possibility that an alternative 
object be established ([4.b], [4.b']) 
Of the two meanings of the word anyatara, one can safely say, the first one 
([4.a], [4.a.1], [4.a.2]) – the indeterminate establishment of an object as a 
second factor under the condition that both of the two can be a second – is the 
main concern of the Crvkas. Since, as Dharmottara explains, they intend that 
either of the two is indeterminately a second, that is, a pot is a second factor for 
a wall as the subject of the exemplification and a body is a second factor for a 
pot as the subject of the thesis, they must have accepted on the one hand the 
possibility – both of the two, the pot and the body, can be a second factor – and 
on the other hand the indeterminacy as regards which of the two is a second 
factor, i.e., a thing other than the subject (dharmin).42 There is, however, 
another meaning of the word anyatara, namely, the possibility of an object to 
be a second ([4.b], [4.b']), although Dharmottara interprets that it is not 
intended by them.43 When the word anyatara is used in this sense, that is, when 
                     
42 See Dh 25a4–6 = Skt. ms. 20a4f. (ad PVin III 290a8): iha tu sadvityaprayoge ghae-
na kuyasya dehena ghaasya sdhyadharmi
a	(1) sadvityatva vdina iam. tena 
dvayor apy arthntaratvam abhyupagantavyam,(2) aniyamena tu tad arthntaratvam 
anyataratra pratipattavyam, dntadharmi
i ghae sdhyadharmi
i ca dehe ((1)Tib. 
25a4: bsgrub par bya ba’i chos  (2)Tib. 25a5: khas bla o //) (“In this formulation [of 
the reason for the consequence, being] accompanied by a second, however, it is 
intended by the proponent [, the Crvkas,] that [in the case of the exemplification] a 
wall [as the subject of the exemplification] is accompanied by a second, i.e., a pot 
[referred to by the word anyatara], [and in the case of the thesis] the subject of the 
thesis, a pot, [is accompanied] by [a second, i.e., the person characterized as] a body 
[referred to by the word anyatara]. Therefore, it should be assumed that both [members 
referred to by the word anyatara, i.e., the pot and the body, are a companion of the 
respective subject and hence] have [the property,] being a thing other [than the subject 
(dharmin)], but [in accordance with the difference of the subject] it should be indeter-
minately cognized that either [the pot or the body] has this [property,] being a thing 
other [than the subject, namely, in the way that] in the case of the subject of the exem-
plification the pot [referred to by the word anyatara] has [the property – being a thing 
other than the subject of the exemplification, the wall as the example –]; in the case of 
the subject of the thesis the body [referred to by the word anyatara] has [the property – 
being a thing other than the subject of the thesis, the pot –]”).  
43 See Dh 25a6f. = Skt. ms. 20a6f. (ad PVin III 290a8): samprati(1) tv anabhipretam api 
vidhiviayasambhavakhypanrtham anyataraabdam abhyupagamynyatarasya 
dvityatva ghaasya dehasya v na sambhavatti daritam ((1)Tib. 25a6: de lta na (P; 
na om. D 21b7) for samprati) (“Now, however, assuming that the word anyatara is 
[used] for the purpose of indicating the possibility that an object be established, 
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it indicates a possible alternative (vikalpa), then the relationship between 
anayatara and dvitya implied by their thesis is as follows: either of the two 
(anyatara) in the sense of the alternative can be a second (dvitya) ([4.b]). This 
statement is negated, when the necessary condition for it – at least one of the 
two can be a second ([5.b]) – is negated. In this way one can prove the negation 
of the universality of their thesis. In order to negate the necessary condition that 
at least one of the two can be a second, one must show that neither of the two 
can be a second factor for the subject (dharmin); that is, neither can be a thing 
other than the subject of the thesis and the subject of the exemplification. Thus, 
Dharmakrti proceeds to refute their thesis further on the grounds that neither of 
the members referred to by the word anyatara can satisfy the limitation 
([3.b.2]) that anyatara is a thing other than both subjects.44 
[The limitation implied by the thesis taken as a universal, namely –] anyatara’s 
being a thing other than [the subject] (anyatarrthntarabhva) –, which [is taken] 
generally (smnyena) in such a way that either of the two, i.e., the pot or the body, 
is a thing other than [both subjects, the subject of the thesis and the example] (gha-
aarrayor anyatarad arthntarabhtam), could be [what is to be proved], if one of 
the two [i.e., one of the pot and the body] were accepted to be so (tayor ekasya ta-
thbhyupagame) [i.e., to be a thing other than both subjects]. The latter [statement 
that one of the two, the pot or the body, is a thing other than the pot and the wall], 
                     
although [this interpretation of the purpose of the word] is not intended [by the 
Crvkas themselves, Dharmakrti] has shown that it is not possible that either of the 
two, the pot or the body, is a second [factor for the subject]”). 
44 Cf. Dh 23a7f. = Skt. ms. 18b3f. (ad PVin III 290a2): prva ghaapuruasamudyo 
dntt sdhyadharmina ca nrthntaram, ata	 smnyasdhybhva(1) ukta	. sam-
praty eko ’pi ghaa	 puruo <’>pi v na dvitya	, tata	 smnynraya	(2) ((1)°bhv 
ms.  (2)Tib. 23a8: spyi la (D 20a5; pa la) brten (D; bstan P) pa ma yin te /) (“In the 
former [refutation, i.e., in PVin III 289b5ff., it is shown that] the combination of the pot 
and the person [which are referred to by the word anyatara] is not a thing other than the 
example and the subject of the thesis; therefore it is said that [with respect to the object 
of the word anyatara] there is no universal [property, i.e., being a second factor,] to be 
proved. In the present [refutation, it shall be shown that] even one [of the two members 
referred to by the word anyatara], be it the pot or the person, is not a second [factor]; 
therefore, [the object of the word anyatara] has no universal [i.e., the universal prop-
erty, being a second factor,] as [its] basis”); Bu 364,6f. (ad PVin III 290a2): ya (ca) 
es pa sar lus bum tshogs pa dpe da chos can las don gan bkag nas bsgrub bya ’gog 
la ’dir lus bum so so bkag nas ’gog pas so //. In his commentary to Dharmakrti’s con-
cluding remark on the refutation of the Crvkas’ thesis (see PVin III 290b5f.) Dhar-
mottara observes very truly: “Or it is impossible that this particular [member referred to 
by the word anyatara], too, is a thing other than [the object that] pervades both subjects 
[, the subject of the thesis and the example]” (Dh 26b8 = Skt. ms. 21b4: (1tad api v1) 
viiam ubhayadharmivypyarthntaram nopapadyate.  (1)de ya (P; ni D 23a7)). 
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however, is not [accepted by the Crvkas themselves] in the case [where one of the 
two is] the body, because there is a room for doubt as to whether [being 
accompanied by the body as the companion] might fail to be co-present (ananvaya-
ak) [with the reason, being not a blue lotus, in the example, the wall];45 in the 
case [where one of the two is] the pot, [the statement that one of the two is a thing 
other than both subjects is] not [accepted either], because it is contradictory [that the 
pot is a thing other than the pot that is the subject of the thesis].46 
Since neither of the members referred to by the word anyatara can be a second 
factor, it is impossible for the Crvkas to assume a universal property “being a 
second factor”;47 this automatically shows that the word anyatara cannot be 
                     
45 See Dh 24a1f. = Skt. ms. 19a3f.: sa(1) ity arthntarabhvo na arrasya tathbh-
tasya dnte <’>nanvayaakay svayam abhyupagata	 ((1)Tib. de ltar). The doubt 
arises because the Crvkas in their indication of the example merely assume that the 
pot as one of the two is accompanied by the wall and hence a thing other than the wall, 
but do not in any way say that their version of the material person characterized as the 
body is accompanied by the wall and is a thing other than it. 
46 PVin III 290a4f.: de bin du de gñis gcig (P; om. D 192a4) de ltar khas len na bum 
pa da lus dag las ga ya ru ba’i don gan du gyur pa es spyir ga ya ru ba’i don 
gan gyi o bor (P ; bo D) ’gyur ba yin na / (1de lta ma yin te1)/ lus rjes su ’gro ba med 
par (2dogs pa bum pa da ya2) ’gal ba’i phyir ro // = Skt. MsII 36a6f.: tath ghaa-
arrayor anyatarad arthntarabhtam iti smnyennyatarrthntarabhvas tayor 
ekasya tathbhyupagame syt. (1sa ca na1) arrasynanvaya(2akay, na ghaasya2) 
virodht ((1)Tib.: de lta ma yin te for sa ca na.  2Tib. diviates from Skt.). Against Dhar-
makrti’s refutation through the argument that none of the two members referred to by 
the word anyatara can be a second in the context of the Crvkas’ inference, an 
objection is raised: There is no fault of denying two cases when one says that either 
Devadatta or Yajñadatta is to be provided with meals, but not Devadatta and not 
Yajñadatta, because one intends that it is not the case that only Devadatta is provided 
with meals (see PVin III 290a6f.: lha sbyin ’ba’ ig la ma yin no sñam du bsams pa’i 
phyir = Skt. MsII 36a7f.: na devadatta evety abhipryt). Dharmakrti replies that 
according to the context the meaning of the word anyatara does not entail determinacy 
of this kind and admits that here the word is used in the sense of the alternative: 
“When, for example, one prescribes that either of the two be provided with meals 
(anyatarabhojana), [the word anyatara has a proper meaning] when [not only both of 
the two but also] one [of the two] is provided with meals (ekabhojane), because this 
(word anyatara) has the alternative (vikalpa) as [its] object” (PVin III 290a7f.: dper na 
gcig za (D 192a7; zas P) ya(1) ga ya ru ba za’o es brjod pa bin no // ’di’i yul ni 
rnam par brtag (D; brtags P) pa yin pa’i phyir ro //  (1)ya has no equivalent in Skt. 
MsII 36b1, MsI 38a3). 
47 See PVin III 290a2f.: ’di’i phyir ya spyi la brten pa ma yin te / gsal ba thams cad 
yod par mi srid na de’i spyi mi ’thad pa’i phyir ro // dper na bram ze la sogs pa ma yin 
pa ñid la rigs (P; rig D 192a2) ñid dam / … bin no // = Skt. MsII 36a4f.: ita ca na 
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used also in the second sense ([4.b]), namely in the sense of the alternative 
indicating the possibility for an object to be a second. Consequently their thesis 
based on the second meaning of the word anyatara does not hold. 
 Dharmakrti summarizes the above-mentioned two arguments based on the 
two meanings of the word anyatara as follows: 
In addition, since it is impossible to establish (vidher ayogt) [any of the two 
referred to by the word ‘either of the two’ as a second factor], then for [each] one of 
the two that is to be established (dvayor ekasya vidhyamnasya) [in the Crvkas’ 
thesis], neither the alternative [i.e., the disjunctive statement that this one or the 
other is a second factor] nor the collection [i.e., the conjunctive statement that this 
one and the other are a second factor] is possible (vikalpasamuccayyoge). How 
then can [they] now establish (vidhe	 smarthyam) [generally that either the pot or 
the body is a second for both subjects]?48 
The meaning of the word anyatara in the context of the Crvkas’ thesis, as has 
been pointed out, consists of either the indeterminacy with respect to which of 
the two is a second ([4.a.2]) under the condition that both of the two can be a 
second ([4.a.1]) or the possibility for one of the two to be a second ([4.b]). 
Since the indeterminacy with respect to one of the two implies the possibility 
for both of the two to be a second (see [5.a]), and the latter means the 
possibility of the conjunction of the two, broadly speaking, the first meaning of 
the word anyatara, i.e., an undetermined one of the two ([4.a']), would imply 
the possibility of the conjunction of the two. On the other hand the second 
meaning of the word anyatara, i.e., a possible one of the two ([4.b']), implies 
that one of the two can be at least a second (see [5.b]), and does not presuppose 
the condition necessary for the first meaning of the word anyatara, i.e., the 
                     
smnyraya	, sarvavyakti(1)sambhavbhve tatsmnyyogt, yathbrhma
ditve(2) 
var
atvasya(3) … ((1)vyakti° MsI; vyakta° MsII  (2)’brhma
ditve MsI; ’bhma-





asya MsI) (“For the following [reason], 
too, [the object of the word anyatara] has no universal [i.e., the universal property 
‘being a second factor’] as [its] basis, [namely it is] because, as far as there is no 
possibility for all substances [i.e., members referred to by the word anyatara, to have 
their particular properties ‘being a second factor’], it is impossible [for them to have] 
the universal of the [particular properties], for example, when [for people] there is no 
[particular properties] to be Brahmins and so on, [it is impossible for them to have the 
universal] to belong to a class”, translated in Tillemans 2000, 62, n.216). 
48 PVin III 290a8–b1: sgrub pa mi ’thad pa’i ya phyir te / gñis gcig la bsgrub (D 
192b1; sgrub P) pa la ya(1) rnam par brtag pa da bsdu ba ya(2) mi ’thad pa yin na da 
ci ig sgrub par nus te / ((1)ya has no equivalent in Skt. Ms II 36b1 = MsI 38a3  (2)ya 
has no equivalent in Skt. Ms II 36b1: vikalpasamuccayyoge; MsI 38a4: °samuccayo 
yoge /). 
The word ia in Dharmakrti’s definition of the thesis 339 
condition that both of the two can be a second. In this sense the second 
meaning of the word anyatara ([4.b']) might roughly correspond to the 
possibility of the disjunction of the two. In their thesis, however, none of the 
meanings can be established. This is the logic of Dharmakrti’s refutation of the 
Crvkas’ thesis taken as a universal. 
II.2.3. Refutation of the Crvkas’ thesis on account of the nonexistence of anya-
tara in general or its qualification arthntara “a thing other than” in general 
We may note, in passing, that there is another type of refutation of their thesis 
taken as a universal. According to the limitation ([3.b.2]) – either of the two 
(anyatara) is a thing other than (arthntara) both subjects (dharmin) –, an-
yatara is qualified by “a thing other than”. In order for their property to be 
proved, anyatarasadvityatva, to be universal (smnya), anyatara in general is 
to be assumed. Let us look at it from the angle of the universality of its 
qualification. The latter means the invariance of the content of the qualification 
“a thing other than the subject”. 
When the property to be proved, anyatarasadvityatva, is universal, the content of 
the qualification of anyatara – a thing other than (arthntara) the subject – must be 
invariable regardless of which member of the two is referred to by the word an-
yatara. [6] 
In the context of their inference, however, the content of the qualification “a 
thing other than the subject” is variable in accordance with the difference 
whether anyatara is the pot or the body. This is because they do not accept that 
both of the two members referred to by the word anyatara, the pot and the 
body, are qualified by the same qualification, namely, both of the two are a 
thing other than one and the same subject. Rather they maintain that each 
member is a thing other than its own corresponding subject. In consequence, 
there is no universality of the qualification of anyatara: 
It is because it is impossible that both [of the pot and the body] are a thing other 
than [the same subject (dharmin)]. When namely [the subject is] the example [i.e., a 
wall], the pot [referred to by the word anyatara, being a companion of the wall,] is a 
thing other than [this subject as the wall], but when [the subject is] the subject of the 
thesis [i.e., the pot], the body [, being a companion of the pot, is a thing other than 
this subject as the pot]; therefore, [each member, which is] a thing other than [its 
own corresponding subject,] is specific [and hence] not universal.49  
                     
49 Dh 26b7f. = Skt. ms. 21b3 (ad PVin III 290b5f.): arthntarabh
tasya (1dvaya-
sy1)nupapatte	. dnte hi ghao <’>rthntara sdhyadharmi
i ca deha	, tena vii-
am evrthntaram, na smnyam  ((1)Skt. words (arra ghao v) which contextually 
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Thus, the property, being a thing other than the subject, becomes different in 
accordance with the difference of the member referred to by the word anyatara, 
as mentioned before ([4.a.3]); therefore, anyatara qualified by “a thing other 
than the subject” is not universal. In consequence, their universal thesis based 
on the word anyatara is not established. 
II.3. Application of the idea of the refutation of the sadvityaprayoga to 
another case 
The logical analysis of the refutation of sadvityaprayoga holds also in other 
cases, for example, when an opponent formulates an inference that sound is 
eternal because it is either of the two, i.e., the subject of the thesis or the similar 
instances (pakasapaknyatara), Dharmakrti negates this reason based on the 
expression “being either of the two” in the same way as mentioned above: 
In addition, if it were not contradictory that [one and the same subject of the thesis 
(sdhyadharmin), i.e., sound,] could be [each of] the two [i.e., the subject of the 
thesis and the similar instances] (dvayor api sambhavvirodhe), [then] this [reason, 
pakasapaknyataratva,] would thus be [established in the sound as the subject of 
the thesis]; otherwise, however, this would not be established (asiddha) at all [as 
present] in sound, because the sound in question is exclusively the subject of the 
thesis (paka eva), but not either of the two, i.e., the subject of the thesis or the 
similar instances (na pakasapakayor anyatara	), since it is contradictory that [it is 
on the one hand] an [arbitrary] alternative [of the two] and [on the other hand] 
simply determined [as a specific one of the two] (vikalpaikapratiniyamayor viro-
dht).50 
Here the meaning of the word anyatara presupposes not the possibility for the 
subject of the thesis to be an arbitrary one of the two ([4.b']), but the 
indeterminacy with respect to one of the two ([4.a']), namely, the possibility for 
the subject of the thesis to be both the subject of the thesis and the similar 
instances (as in [5.a]). In short, the word anyatara is used not in the disjunctive 
but in the conjunctive sense. Dharmakrti negates the opponent’s reason using 
                     
belong to the preceding phrase are translated together with dvayasya in Tib.: lus sam 
bum pa gñis …).  
50 PVin III 290b2f.: gan ya gñi gar ya srid pa mi ’gal na de de ltar ’gyur gyi / (1de 
lta ma yin na ni de sgra la ma grub pa ñid do //1) ’di ltar rnam pa de lta bu’i sgra de ni 
phyogs ñid yin gyi (P; te D 192b2) / phyogs da mthun pa’i phyogs dag las ga ya ru 
ba ni ma yin te / (P; no // D) rnam par brtag pa da gcig tu so sor es pa ’gal ba’i phyir 
ro // ((1)anyath tv asiddham (MsI 38a5; athnyatvasiddham MsII 36b2) eva tac (MsII; 
etac MsI) chabde). For the various usage of the sadvitya-type argumentation see Tille-
mans 2000, 59. 
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the word anyatara on the grounds that the presupposition for the usage of the 
word anyatara – the subject of the thesis can be both the subject of the thesis 
and the similar instances – does not hold. 
Summary 
Dharmakrti introduces a new interpretation of the word ia in the definition of 
the thesis, which is not found explicitly in Dignga. Through this interpretation, 
namely the rule that what the proponent really intends to prove is the thesis, not 
anything that is merely stated, he intends to refute those theses which are stated 
ambiguously with a view to avoiding a criticism. In his PVin III he gives 
several examples of the inference in which the thesis is stated ambiguously and 
shows that, if the above mentioned rule were not accepted, it would follow 
either that the opposite of the intended property to be proved is proved or that 
the proof itself is useless. He illustrates the first undesirable consequence, 
namely the proof of the opposite, by means of an argument formulated by the 
Avyutpattivdins against the Vyutpattivdins in favor of the thesis based on 
Vkyapadya I 67 that the word has its proper object before its connection with 
the named. As for the second undesirable consequence, uselessness of the 
proof, he exemplifies it in his refutation of the Skhyas’ inference of the 
existence of the Self. Further, he takes as an example the Crvkas’ 
formulation of the proof of their thesis – “A pot is accompanied by a second 
(sadvitya), namely by either of the two (anyatara) – a person characterized as 
a body, or a pot” – in order to show that on the basis of his interpretation of the 
word ia such pseudo-proofs formulated by means of the word anyatara can 
be refuted. He divides the property to be proved into two types – the particular 
property to be proved and the universal property to be proved – and indicates 
faults in these two forms of the thesis. 
It is typical of his reasoning that in some cases without alluding to a detailed 
explanation he uses examples which are quite difficult to grasp. In this paper I 
have analyzed examples of this sort, namely the above-mentioned first and 
third examples, with the help of commentaries. In my analysis of Dharmakrti’s 
refutation of the Crvkas’ statement, with a view to clarifying his refutation, I 
have enumerated the limitations which context imposes on the terms, anyatara, 
dvitya and the subject of the thesis, as used in their statement. These 
limitations serve as the basis for explaining Dharmakrti’s reference to 
contradiction or inconsistency in the Crvkas’ statement. For the deter-
mination of the limitations, Dharmottara’s extensive discussion is very useful. 
In particular, his interpretation of the key word, anyatara, by means of the 
introduction of the modal concept of possibility (sambhava) facilitates our 
analysis of Dharmakrti’s method of refutation. That is, his interpretation 
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allows us to grasp that his long excursus on the refutation in PVin III, which 
seems at first glance to be verbose because of the repetitive treatment of similar 
topics, in fact reflects a systematic aim to refute the Crvkas’ thesis from two 
angles that are based on two meanings of the word anyatara. 
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